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hallvard j. fossheim
I wish to suggest an explanation for why Plato lets Socrates present – and force 
those present to agree to – the hedonist theory in the Protagoras. My suggestion 
is that the Protagoras, by means of a combined effort on an argumentative-
structural level and on a dramatic level, lets us see and experience central 
facets of the two methodologies defended by Protagoras and Socrates, 
respectively: while Protagoras’ sort of speechmaking lets the listener be lured 
in by a loose and semi-digested vision, Socrates’ favoured form of question-
and-answer activity comes with a built-in defence against such psychological 
shaping, making it, in this respect, a safer way of submitting to pedagogical 
soul-forming. This quality of his activity has to do both with the format itself 
and with the sort of mode in which it sets those who are exposed to it.
While I think that the hypothesis constitutes a believable explanation for 
the presence of the hedonist theory, I think that it (the hypothesis) is also 
worthy of interest independently of a need to explain that theory.
A question of method
The bulk of the Protagoras constitutes a battle of wits between Socrates and 
Protagoras. Crucially, the open disagreements concern both theses/truths and 
methodology. Perhaps surprisingly, it is on the methodological level that the 
disagreement creates the most drama. At the point where this disagreement 
surfaces most forcefully, we have already had a taste of Protagoras’ penchant 
for longish monologues and Socrates’ desire to carry out his investigation by 
means of short questions and answers. And Socrates goes as far as to threaten 
to leave the company and the conversation altogether if he does not get his 
way.
As you can argue in both styles, you should have made me some concession, so that we 
could have had a conversation. But now, since you are not willing to do so, and I have 
an engagement, and couldn’t wait for you to spin out these long speeches – I have to go 
somewhere – I shall go. (Prt. 335C)1
1 All translations are by Taylor 1996.
136 Hallvard	J.	Fossheim
Socrates adds emphasis to his threat by actually getting up as if to leave (Prt. 
335D). His ultimatum provokes a series of methodological comments and 
suggestions from several of those who are present. The comments also have 
the function of bringing home what has already been indicated by Socrates’ 
words at this point – namely that the two methodologies are well known 
among those present as alternative ways of communicating.
The drama of the dialogue also lets us appreciate how the difference 
between ‘shortspeaking’ (βραχυλογία) and ‘longspeaking’ (μακρολογία),2 
i.e. a difference in methodology, may additionally be related to differences 
in character that are not altogether accidental. This point is emphasized by 
Plato when he lets Prodicus and Hippias dramatize themselves in the course 
of the methodological discussion, thus reminding us that the method of each 
is intimately linked to the personality or character of each. But the role of 
character is the most emphatic in the contrast between Protagoras and Socrates 
– the one jovial and friendly, but easily distressed by attempts to undermine 
his authority, the other sharp and shifty, but always willing to go through an 
extra round of testing in order to get rid of mistakes and move closer to the 
truth.
So what are the two interlocutors’ preferred methodologies? The method of 
instruction favoured in this case by Protagoras is exemplified in his so-called 
Great Speech. He presents what is supposed to constitute an explanation 
by combining mythological storytelling with elucidations or arguments 
pertaining to certain parts, and he does so without interruptions in the course 
of the presentation. The result is a rather grand vision, fleshed out in very 
broad outlines with little detail. In addition, the replies are presented mainly in 
a mythical format that hides which mechanisms or causal relations are really 
in play (provided, of course, that the individualized figures of Epimetheus, 
Prometheus, and Zeus are not to be taken literally as the ultimate explanations 
offered).
The method of instruction favoured by Socrates is exemplified not least 
in the long section (from 351B on) where he drags the others along the path 
towards hedonism. By contrast with the Protagorean approach to imparting 
putative knowledge, Socrates’ method requires dividing the package to 
be delivered into small fragments and forcing the interlocutor to consider 
and agree to them one by one before proceeding to the next one. Formally, 
this process consists of Socrates posing leading or hypothetical questions, 
interspersed with explanatory notes, and the interlocutor indicating that he 
agrees to the step being taken for each move. (Presumably, as long as the 
2 The terms are used by Socrates in a parallel discussion in Grg. 449C.
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interlocutor follows the exposition and does not arrive at a point where he 
is clear that he is no longer willing to accept the consequences of what has 
gone before, the instruction’s success does not depend entirely on his saying 
his responses out loud. But since the audience for most people, including 
Protagoras, provides extra motivation for being careful about what one agrees 
to, the inclusion of some public affirmation will have a sharpening effect on 
the respondent.) 
The danger in soul-shaping
The ridiculousness of the setting where all the sophists are introduced (Prt. 
314E ff) makes for quite a contrast with the opening of the Protagoras’ main 
bulk (i.e. following the framing sequence); the main dialogue’s opening 
possesses an unambiguous, down-to-earth earnestness which we find only 
rarely in Plato. Says Socrates to his eager young companion:
Don’t take chances in a matter of such importance. For you know, there’s much more risk in 
buying learning than in buying food. If you buy food or drink from a pedlar or a merchant 
you can carry it away in another container, and before you actually eat or drink it you can 
set it down at home and call in an expert and take his advice on what you ought to eat or 
drink and what you ought not, and how much, and when you ought to take it. So there is no 
risk in buying. But you can’t carry learning away in a jar; you have to put down the price 
and take the learning into your soul right away. By the time you go away you have already 
assimilated it, and got the harm or the benefit. (Prt. 314A–B)
At the point when Socrates says these words to Hippocrates, the young man 
has tried to pull Socrates along to meet Protagoras, so eager for the meeting 
that he has arrived at Socrates’ place while it is still too dark to see. (This fact 
is used by Socrates as an argument for them to wait for daylight before setting 
off, and it is the excuse which makes it possible for Socrates to have a proper 
tête-à-tête in order to warn Hippocrates before confronting the great sophist 
in Prt. 311A).
What is conveyed by Socrates in the opening sequence is the fact that through 
our being educated, we are, partially through our own agency or engagement, 
affected by the educator in such a way that we become something we were 
not, without knowing beforehand what it is we will become, or whether that 
development is for the better or for the worse. For the sophistic forms of soul 
shaping, the normal state of affairs is one where the person does not know what 
the education does to him before it has already entered and become an integral 
part of him (if even then). In other words, the issue framing the drama of the 
Protagoras is that of being altered by someone. This is something Socrates 
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clearly believes to be possible – in fact, that possibility is the source of his 
worries. (When at Prt. 319A–20C he says he does not believe that virtue can 
be taught, he thinks of teaching in a narrow sense as systematic instruction, 
in contradistinction to Protagoras’ much wider understanding of teaching as 
socialization).3 
There is a humorous little reminder of the difficulty involved in identifying 
types of educators at the stage where Hippocrates and Socrates try to enter 
Callias’ house. The person opening the door mistakes them for sophists, a 
fact which immediately shifts the mood from the seriousness of the preceding 
scene into something almost farcical, since he slams the door in their faces 
(Prt. 314C–E). While this episode functions as a coda for the scene confronting 
them inside, it also illustrates how it is not obvious who is who in matters of 
education.
Protagoras shares Socrates’ understanding of what is at stake, in the sense 
that Protagoras in his public self-presentation places himself in the company 
of all sorts of educators up to his own time.
I maintain that the craft of the sophist is an ancient one, but that its practitioners in ancient 
times, for fear of giving offence, adopted the subterfuge of disguising it as some other craft, 
as Homer and Hesiod and Simonides did with poetry, and Orpheus and Musaeus and their 
followers with religious rites and prophesies. Some, I have heard, went in for physical 
training, like Iccus of Taras and, in our own day, Herodicus of Selymbria (originally of 
Megara), as good a sophist as any. Your fellow citizen Agathocles, a great sophist, used music 
and literature as cover, and so did Pythocleides of Ceos and many others. (Prt. 316D–E)
The most interesting feature of this passage is not that Protagoras refers to all 
educators as sophists – that is a ploy to provide himself with the legitimacy 
and authority of tradition and acknowledged expertise – but that he presents 
himself as an educator. With this in mind, it is easy to appreciate the intimate 
relation between the opening part and the main part of the dialogue.
Method and substance
So why the hedonist section? The presentation of this theory does not 
forcefully dramatize that people are changed by instruction, because in the end 
no one seems to comfortably believe that theory. I suggest that the function 
of that presentation may be the very opposite of persuading anyone of its 
truth, namely, that of illustrating for us that there is a safety valve in Socrates’ 
3 The qualities are described and named in different ways in the Protagoras, but at least from 320A on 
‘virtue’ (ἀρετή) figures prominently.
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manner of teaching, consisting of the fact that this methodology forces the 
pupil, interlocutor, or reader to face rationally whatever is introduced before 
making it part of his/her soul.
This suggestion has the merit of fitting perfectly with the opening’s 
description of how most soul shaping is dangerous precisely because the 
teaching goes on in a manner such that elements are assimilated into one’s soul 
before one can examine them. This was, as we remember, Socrates’ greatest 
worry. The dialogue dramatizes, through the interlocutors’ hesitant reactions 
and the reader’s own reactions, that the worry is nowhere near as acute if we 
stick to the Socratic manner of teaching.
Which qualities of this brand of  βραχυλογία make it so different to Protagorean 
μακρολογία when it comes to the possibility of imparting (putative) knowledge 
with a lower risk of unhealthy assimilation? Two features in particular stand out 
when the two methods are contrasted as they are in the Protagoras. First, there is 
the analysis of the content into minimal packages, which can then be considered 
in isolation. And secondly, there is the demand that the interlocutor take an 
active stance towards each parcel, deciding then and there whether or not he 
or she is willing, for now, to accept each proposition.4 In contrast, Protagorean 
μακρολογία gives one a feeling that one is in the presence of a grander vision 
of something, with few details even visible; and instead of critically examining 
that vision, one accepts it – if it is accepted – on a combination of trust in the 
speaker’s insight and some kind of admiration of his ability to conjure up the 
apparently seamless image in the first place.
The dialogue indicates, then, that one form of education is safer than the 
alternative with which it is contrasted, while at the same time it reminds us that 
we are the sort of beings that are susceptible to different kinds of education. 
The final hedonistic tour de force lets us experience this difference first-hand.
A	final	remark	on	form	and	content
We can make sense of one additional feature of the Protagoras by adopting 
the suggested interpretation. Plato’s Protagoras is made to present a view of 
education, and of human beings, as not only rational but multi-faceted even 
on the best of days. One thing that might strike the reader of the dialogue is 
the extent to which this vision, at least superficially, resembles the complex 
view of humanity and moral psychology that Socrates details in certain other 
4 This also suggests another aspect of dialectic in the sense of critical, leading questioning: it is a method 
of inquiry whereby the participant and audience do not just learn during the interaction, but whereby 
important parts of the learning process normally take place after the actual interaction is over.
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dialogues.5 Protagoras holds that our qualities are more like the parts of a face 
than they are like pieces of gold (Prt. 329D–E). A version of this view is what 
we find in e.g. the Republic – a version which operates with three politico-
ethically relevant soul parts, each with its distinctive function and dynamics, 
analogous to the relation between, say, eyes and mouth (only by each doing 
its unique job properly and in coordination with the other can most of us 
function in everyday life). Similarly, Protagoras is made to conjure up a vision 
of education as socialization, that is, as something which is the prerogative of 
the city as a whole and which takes place through a thousand nudges from a 
thousand directions, not only from a specific kind of rational interaction with 
a teacher (although that activity is what can bring someone to the final, higher 
realizations of reason). Again, this is more or less the gist of the Republic’s 
version of how to produce a decent human being.6
I take it that this otherwise baffling and confusing feature of the Protagoras 
makes perfect sense if the primary aim of the dialogue is not to present a given 
content (‘Here’s the truth about …’), but rather a certain form (‘This is how 
you …’). Precisely by letting the sophist wander closer to a believable version 
of the truth about moral psychology and education, while Socrates is made to 
present a theory that is over-simplistic and alien to most of what the author 
pays attention to in his other works, Plato manages to bring out the difference 
between the two. In the Protagoras, the central issue is not which theory to 
believe, but which methodology to abide by.
The Protagoras forcefully demonstrates how Plato focuses on questions 
of methodology not only when he lets his characters stop in their tracks and 
discuss it explicitly, but also – and not least – when the reader is lulled into 
thinking that only the theses and arguments under consideration define what 
is going on in the text.
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